Authors
- Blokhina Natalia Alexandrovna Candidate of Philosophy, docent
Annotation
Virtue epistemology as the current of analytical epistemology appeared in the last third of the twentieth century and became an alternative to naturalized epistemology
protected by W. V. O. Quine. As opposed to descriptive Quine’s epistemology, virtue epistemology prescribes what is the way to reach the indisputable truth. Thus, she continues the tradition of classical rationalistic epistemology, dealing with issues of normative cognition. One of the currents of virtue epistemology is reliabilism, which explores questions of the truth of knowledge in the absence of confirmation of the position in which the subject of knowledge is convinced. The truth can be guaranteed, according to reliabilists, by the reliability of the process of forming this belief. This feature of reliabilism makes it a valuable cognitive resource for the development of problems of analytical metaphysics and ontology, the provisions of which may not be confirmed. This formulation of the question is very relevant, has not yet been studied in the domestic literature and requires consideration. The subject of our consideration is a virtue reliabilist theory supplemented by the basic notion of the process reliabilism of Christoph Kelp (University of Glasgow). The central concept of his theory is performance normativity. It consists of abilities, dispositions, ways
of producing performances (ways of performing) and success conditions, that’s what makes our beliefs competent. It is the ways of producing performances that serve as a link between the virtue reliabilism and the process reliabilism. Thanks to this addition, his theory manages to overcome a number of conceptual difficulties that process reliabilism has encountered. They are — the problem of worldbound reliability, “the new evil demon” problem, the problem of clairvoyant cases, generality problem. According to Kelp, his version of reliabilism is not without drawbacks, which he called “modus ponens inferences” and “the cogito”. However, the author of this article does not attribute them to difficulties on the grounds that they do not violate the normativity of the very concept of Christoph Kelp.
How to link insert
Blokhina, N. A. (2023). RELAIBILISM OF VIRTUES AS A FORM OF NORMATIVE ARGEMENTATION Bulletin of the Moscow City Pedagogical University. Series "Pedagogy and Psychology", 2023, №1 (45), 33. https://doi.org/10.25688/2078-9238.2023.45.1.3
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